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Key points 
This Policy Brief offers an in-depth review of the Stability and Growth Pact (SGP) and looks at 
whether the margins of flexibility within existing rules are sufficient in the current climate of low 
growth, or whether there is a need to broaden them. The issue is especially relevant as the 
changing economic environment is raising fresh questions about whether the EU’s current 
common economic policies are able to manage dismal growth and low inflation. The fragile state 
of confidence in financial markets and the unresolved but inevitable questions of moral hazard 
linked to lax fiscal policies mean that no large-scale fiscal expansion to support the recovery of 
economic activity is feasible. The discussion may therefore only concern the scope within the SGP 
to accommodate an unexpected drop in economic activity and to provide room for the 
implementation of structural reforms. Here, we analyse the flexibility clauses of the Stability and 
Growth Pact under three headings; namely “exceptional circumstances”, “structural reforms and 
other relevant factors”, and the “investment clause”. 
Recommendation 
Our main conclusion is that the SGP contains sufficient flexibility to accommodate an unexpected 
drop in economic activity and has the margins needed to finance structural reforms during the 
transition to the new regime. We therefore see no need to change the existing rules of the SGP. We 
believe that the ongoing debate about a fresh growth strategy for the eurozone and the European 
Union would greatly benefit from removing from the Council table ill-formulated and unnecessary 
demands for greater flexibility in the SGP. 
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Introduction 
The policy debate about how best to restore 
growth in the flagging eurozone economy 
has been plagued by demands from some 
highly indebted member countries that the 
Stability and Growth Pact (SGP) be loosened 
to leave greater room to support the economy 
with budgetary instruments. These demands 
have been met with an instant rebuff from the 
Commission and other financially solid 
members who argue that loosening the Pact 
would do little to restore sound growth. This 
question has also hindered the broader 
discussion on the need for and content of a 
renewed growth strategy for the eurozone 
and the European Union, no least by fuelling 
fresh mistrust among their member states. 
The lack of clarity about what precisely 
would be the scope of budgetary flexibility 
has not helped to resolve the issue. In one 
extreme interpretation, flexibility could mean 
removing altogether the budgetary constraint 
on highly indebted countries and letting 
them support the economy with deficit 
spending and tax cuts. The argument is that 
budgetary austerity was the main culprit in 
pushing the eurozone economy into its 
double-dip recession in 2010-12, and that 
growth could therefore be restored by 
relaxing budgetary constraint. 
Two observations are in order in this regard. 
The IMF (2012) and Blanchard and Leigh 
(2013), among others, have argued that fiscal 
retrenchment in 2010-11 led to a fall in 
economic activity well above forecasts, 
indicating that fiscal multipliers had been 
largely underestimated. What this analysis 
may be overlooking is the major role played 
in the drop in economic activity by the sharp 
contraction of bank credit, owing in turn to 
the collapse of net private foreign financing 
to countries under stress, as depicted in 
Figure 1.1 The drying up of interbank lending 
was the main component in this reduction of 
foreign inflows, and was led by evaporating 
confidence in the banking system of the 
eurozone periphery, in turn due to their 
                                                   
1 Ireland is not included due to lack of comparable 
Eurostat data. 
heavy exposure to national sovereigns.2 The 
ECB compensated the collapse of private 
flows only partially and temporarily through 
its Target-Two balances, but this did not 
prevent the drop in economic activity 
throughout the periphery. Nothing 
comparable happened after the Lehman 
Brothers collapse, when net foreign inflows 
continued – presumably thanks to the 
absence at that time of visible disagreement 
on policy responses among the eurozone 
members. 
This brings us to our second observation. 
While confidence has now been somewhat 
restored to eurozone financial markets, 
thanks to a combination of budgetary 
retrenchment by indebted countries and 
liquidity support from the ECB, the situation 
remains fragile, as shown by the shock-waves 
generated by the difficulties of the 
Portuguese Banco Espírito Santo in mid-July. 
In all likelihood any large-scale relaxation of 
the budgetary constraint in highly indebted 
countries would soon encounter a flight of 
investors. Of course, this could be avoided by 
letting the ECB purchase the sovereigns of 
highly indebted countries or convincing the 
core countries to guarantee the debts of the 
periphery: unfortunately, moral hazard 
considerations would exclude any such 
possibility in practice, as the required 
agreement by the main policy actors would 
never be achieved.  
                                                   
2 IMF econometric estimates on multipliers – while 
taking into account many other potentially relevant 
factors – do not control directly for the collapse of 
net foreign financial flows. The key role of the 
“sudden stop” of net private foreign financing in 
bringing about the eurozone crisis has been seen as 
mainly depending on the eurozone’s peculiar 
institutional structure, which raised doubts in 
financial markets about the availability of liquidity 
support by the ECB for the orderly rollover of 
distressed sovereign exposure (De Grauwe 2011, De 
Grauwe & Ji 2013, and Merler & Pisani-Ferry 2012). 
The confidence crisis was exacerbated by the 
announcement in Deauville (October 2010), and then 
the application in the second Greek package 
(summer 2011), of a new policy of private sector 
participation in sovereign debt restructuring, which 
triggered the contagion of the sovereign debt and 
banking crisis to Spain and Italy.    
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Figure 1. The collapse of net foreign financing in the ‘PIGS’ in 2011-2012 
 
Source: Eurostat 2014. The ‘PIGS’ include: Portugal, Italy, Spain and Greece. 
In sum, any large-scale relaxation of 
budgetary constraint, with the main purpose 
of supporting economic activity, cannot be 
considered seriously. To be sure, this does 
not obviate the potential need for the 
eurozone to act with common policy 
instruments to strengthen the economic 
recovery, including a more aggressive use of 
monetary instruments (as argued by the IMF 
in 2014), a joint initiative to raise public and 
private investment (Bassanini & Reviglio, 
2014), and possibly also a scheme to directly 
address the question of debt sustainability (as 
in Pâris & Wyplosz, 2014). But there is broad 
consensus that these actions must be 
discussed and brought forward without 
endangering the results achieved under fiscal 
consolidation. 
This seems to be the conclusion reached by 
the European Council at their recent meeting 
in June 2014:  
“ ... fiscal consolidation must continue 
in a growth-friendly and differentiated 
manner. Structural reforms that 
enhance growth and improve fiscal 
sustainability should be given 
particular attention [...] while making 
best use of the flexibility that is built 
into the existing Stability and Growth 
Pact rules”.  
They are not excluding a change in the 
general direction of economic policies, but 
they do not consider that this can be achieved 
by relaxing the rules of the SGP. 
It follows that the discussion about flexibility 
within the SGP must have a more limited 
scope, which is how much room is available 
within existing rules for two different goals: 
to cushion an unexpected fall in activity 
through the operation of budgetary 
stabilisers, and to accommodate structural 
reforms capable of strengthening the 
economy and the budget itself in the long 
run, but requiring some budgetary flexibility 
in the short run to meet their initial cost (e.g. 
in the transition to fully funded pension 
systems or a flexi-security model of 
unemployment support).  
The purpose of this paper is to offer a 
detailed review of the SGP and to discuss 
whether the existing margins of flexibility 
are adequate to meet those two separate 
goals. The matter mainly arises with regard 
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to countries that have not undertaken an 
adjustment programme under the aegis of the 
Commission (or the Troika), but may also 
affect countries in excessive deficit procedure 
(EDP). For countries undertaking an 
adjustment programme under Commission 
control, all fiscal requirements are specified 
and enforced in that context.  
The structure of this Brief is as follows. 
Section 1 provides an overview of the SGP’s 
evolution since the Maastricht Treaty. We 
then analyse the flexibility clauses of the SGP 
under three headings, i.e. “exceptional 
circumstances” (section 2), “structural 
reforms and other relevant factors” (section 
3) and the “investment clause” (section 4). 
Section 5 concludes. 
1. An overview of the SGP 
In establishing the Economic and Monetary 
Union (EMU), the Maastricht Treaty 
introduced a number of legal provisions 
disciplining member states’ fiscal policies, 
notably including the prohibition of 
monetary financing of deficits by the ECB or 
national central banks (Article 123, TFEU), 
the no-bail-out clause (Article 125, TFEU) and 
the excessive deficit procedure (EDP, Article 
126 TFEU). The criteria for the “soundness 
and sustainability” of public finances were 
set to coincide with the convergence criteria 
for admission to EMU – 3% for the deficit-to-
GDP ratio and 60% for the debt-to-GDP ratio 
– and were enshrined in Protocol 12 annexed 
to the Treaty. The Maastricht Treaty also 
provided procedures for the coordination 
(convergence) and surveillance of national 
economic policies (under the Broad Economic 
Policies Guidelines, or BEGP, of Article 121, 
TFEU) and specifically for employment 
polices (Article 148, TFEU). Two Council 
Regulations set up the SGP with the specific 
purposes of ensuring compliance with the 
Treaty’s fiscal rules after inception of EMU 
(Regulation 1466/97, the ‘preventive arm’ of 
the SGP under Article 121, TFEU) and setting 
out the implementing procedure of the EDP 
(Regulation 1467/97, the ‘corrective arm’ of 
the SGP under Article 126, TFEU). The 
coercive provisions on excessive deficits and 
the adoption of the BEGP would not apply to 
countries not participating in the common 
currency (countries “with a derogation”, 
Article 139, TFEU) until they joined the euro, 
nor to the UK (Protocol 15) or Denmark 
(Protocol 16).  
The need for common fiscal rules arose from 
the peculiar institutional structure of EMU – 
with a common currency and common 
monetary policy but decentralised fiscal 
policies, which could allow lax budgetary 
policies to threaten the smooth functioning of 
EMU by feeding persistent inflation 
divergence among its members and allowing 
an unsustainable accumulation of sovereign 
debts. A prescient further justification was 
the fear that EMU might loosen the 
borrowing constraint on its members’ 
government budget as risk premia would no 
longer reflect expectations of exchange rate 
depreciation and other borrower-specific 
risks. Similar policies, albeit somewhat less 
constraining, were also adopted by EU 
members not participating in the eurozone. 
In the original formulation, stability (for 
eurozone members) or convergence (for non-
eurozone) programmes would have to 
include a medium-term budgetary position 
(MTO) “close to balance or in surplus”, 
together with an adjustment path towards 
this objective, and the expected path of the 
general government debt ratio.3  
The SGP was subsequently modified twice. In 
2005, the goal was to make it more flexible, 
following repeated violations of the deficit 
rules earlier in the decade in a phase of 
pronounced economic slowdown, 4  and the 
controversial decision by the Ecofin Council 
                                                   
3 Article 3.2(a) of Regulation 1466/1997. 
4  Six euro area member states incurred excessive 
deficits since 1999: Portugal in 2001 (and again in 
2005), Germany and France in 2002, the Netherlands 
and Greece in 2003, and Italy in 2004. Only the 
Netherlands succeeded in correcting its excessive 
deficit in a durable manner. Some countries 
increasingly resorted to temporary measures to 
comply with the rules. In an interview to Le Monde 
(2002), Commission President Prodi famously 
dubbed the Pact as “stupid” for trying to stick to the 
3% rule without taking into account current 
economic conditions. Cf. also De Grauwe (2005).  
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in November 2003 to put in abeyance the 
excessive deficit procedure for France and 
Germany. 5  Three changes were introduced: 
that the MTO should be country specific; that 
it should be set for each country in structural 
terms, that is cyclically adjusted and net of 
one-off and temporary measures; and that it 
would take into account the member states' 
(gross) public debt level and the fiscal 
challenges posed by ageing. 6  Moreover, it 
was decided that the EDP deadlines for 
corrective actions could be extended for 
countries that had taken effective corrective 
action but were faced with “unexpected 
adverse economic events with major 
unfavourable consequences on public 
finances”.7  
However, an important new provision 
required that national budgets would have in 
all circumstances to respect the 3% deficit 
ratio, even in the presence of revenue 
shortfalls due to adverse cyclical 
developments. To this end, countries were 
expected to undertake a stronger adjustment 
effort in good times so as to have more 
latitude for the operation of budgetary 
stabilisers in downturns.8  
In 2011 the SGP was amended again, with the 
so-called Six Pack legislation, 9  this time to 
correct its perceived inability to prevent the 
build-up of unsustainable fiscal imbalances 
that were seen as an important determinant 
of the eurozone crisis. Both the preventive 
and the corrective arm of the Pact were 
strengthened to ensure the early recognition 
                                                   
5 2546th Council meeting - Economic and Financial 
Affairs - Brussels, 25 November 2003C/03/320 
14492/1/03 (Presse 320).  
6  Article 1.1 of Regulation No1055/2005. Cf. also 
Economic and Financial Committee (2012), Section I.  
7 Article 1.5 of Regulation No 1056/2005. 
8 Article 1.3(a) of Regulation No 1055/2005. See also 
High Level Group chaired by Wim Kok (2004). 
9 Regulation No 1175/2011 (preventive arm of SGP); 
Regulation No 1177/2011 (corrective arm of SGP); 
Regulation No 1173/2011 (‘sanction regulation’); 
Council Directive 2011/85/EU (requirements for 
budgetary frameworks); Regulation No 1176/2011 
(‘macroeconomic imbalances procedure’); 
Regulation No 1174/2011 (sanctions under 
macroeconomic imbalances procedure).  
of emerging imbalances, to bring forward 
corrective actions and reinforce the 
sanctioning apparatus. The new rules include 
constraints on the growth of public 
expenditures and an operational criterion for 
the correction of debt/GDP ratios in excess of 
the 60% benchmark. 10  Furthermore, 
Commission proposals on the enforcement of 
the SGP may only be rejected by the Council 
by qualified majority, except for the decision 
on the final stage of sanctions in the SGP 
corrective arm – a shift of power designed to 
strengthen the credibility of the SGP after 
past failures to act by the Council.11  
Finally, in 2013 surveillance under the SGP 
was completed by the adoption of the so-
called Two Pack12 and the entry into force of 
the Fiscal Compact.13  Under the Two Pack, 
eurozone members are required to submit 
their draft budgets to the European 
Commission before they are adopted by 
national parliaments, and the Commission 
may ask for revisions if it considers that the 
draft breaches or is likely to breach the SGP. 
                                                   
10 Expenditure growth should not exceed a reference 
medium-term rate of potential GDP growth, unless 
the excess is matched by discretionary revenue 
measures (Article 1.8 of Regulation 1175/2011); and 
revenue windfalls should be allocated to deficit or 
debt reduction (whereas 18 of Regulation 
1175/2011). The 1/20th criterion requires member 
states whose debt exceeds 60% of GDP to reduce the 
distance between the actual ratio and the 60% 
benchmark each year by 1/20th of the distance 
(Article 1.2 of Regulation 1177/2011).  
11 Cf. Regulation 1173/2011. Simple majority in the 
Council is also sufficient to reject a Commission 
recommendation to adopt a decision establishing 
that no effective action has been taken to correct a 
divergence from the MTO (Article 1.13 of Regulation 
1175/2011).  
12  Regulation No 473/2013 on common provisions 
for monitoring and assessing draft budgetary plans 
and ensuring the correction of excessive deficit of the 
euro area member states (Two Pack I) and 
Regulation No 472/2013 on the strengthening of 
economic and budgetary surveillance of member 
states in the euro area experiencing or threatened 
with serious difficulties with respect to their 
financial stability (Two Pack II). 
13  The Treaty on Stability, Coordination and 
Governance in the Economic and Monetary Union 
(TSCG). 
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Eurozone countries in EDP will be required 
to present an “economic partnership 
programme” providing a roadmap for the 
structural reforms seen as instrumental to “an 
effective and lasting correction” of the 
excessive deficit.14 
Under the Fiscal Compact eurozone members 
(and other EU members voluntarily joining 
the Treaty as “contracting parties”) 
committed to adopt binding rules – 
preferably constitutional – for balanced 
budgets, including the automatic corrective 
mechanism in case of significant deviations 
from the MTO.15  Main changes in the SGP 
since its adoption are summarised in tables 1 
and 2.16 
Finally, the European Semester brings 
national policymaking coordination together 
under the procedure of Article 121 TFEU, 
ensuring ex ante coordination of economic 
policy decisions by the member states within 
the European Council. Under the European 
Semester, the Council issues its country- 
specific recommendations for national 
policies and the eurozone as a whole at the 
end of the first semester, based on national 
stability (budgetary) and economic-reform 
programmes submitted in April; the member 
states then adopt their national budgets and 
policy programmes in the second semester 
under close (ex ante) surveillance by the 
European Commission.17 
2. Exceptional circumstances 
The concept of “exceptional circumstances” 
appears in Article 126.2 (a) of the Treaty 
where it is stated that the EDP would not be 
triggered even if the reference value of the 
deficit ratio (3%) had been breached, when 
the excess over the reference value “is only 
exceptional and temporary and the ratio 
remains close to the reference value”. The 
definition of “exceptional circumstances” is 
provided by the Council Regulation 1467/97 
                                                   
14 Articles 4, 7 and 9 of Regulation 473/2013. 
15 Article 3 of TSCG. 
16 For a comprehensive discussion on the SGP see 
Frayne et al. (2013) and Frayne and Riso (2013). 
17 Article 1.3 of Regulation 1175/2011. 
as amended by Regulations 1056/2005 and 
1177/2011 (henceforth in this paper 
Regulation 1467 – i.e. ‘the corrective arm’ of 
the SGP)18 – as an unusual event outside the 
control of the member state which has a 
major impact on its financial position or a 
severe economic downturn (Article 2.1). The 
text further specifies that any excess over the 
reference value shall be considered as 
temporary if the forecasts provided by the 
Commission indicate that the deficit will fall 
below the reference value following the end 
of the unusual event. 
In the original SGP, an economic downturn 
was qualified as “severe” when annual real 
GDP had fallen by at least 2%. A fall of less 
than 2% could also be considered exceptional 
in the light of further supporting evidence, in 
particular on the abruptness of the downturn 
or on the accumulated loss of output relative 
to past trends.19 In 2005, the benchmark for 
identifying a severe economic downturn was 
eased: the reference to a 2% decline in GDP 
was suppressed and it became sufficient to 
show that there had been a decline in (annual 
real) GDP or an accumulated loss of output 
during a protracted period of very low 
annual real GDP growth relative to potential 
gauged from the output gap – which is 
obviously applicable to current economic 
conditions.20 
It should be stressed that an excess over the 
deficit reference value “may” be considered 
as exceptional by the Commission and the 
Council in light of various circumstances: this 
formulation excludes any automatism in 
deciding that the member state in question is 
indeed facing exceptional circumstances.  
Similarly, when a member state is already 
subject to an EDP, the Commission and the 
Council may issue revised recommendations 
granting longer deadlines (one more year as a 
                                                   
18 (http://eurlex.europa.eu/LexUriServ/LexUriServ.
do?uri=CONSLEG:1997R1467:20111213:EN:PDF). 
19 Cf. Article 2.2 and 2.3 of Regulation 1467/1997. 
20  Article 2.2 Regulation 1467. The indicator for 
assessing the accumulated loss of output, based on 
the output gap, is calculated according to the 
method agreed by the Ecofin Council on 12 July 
2002. 
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rule) to meet their deficit targets when weak 
economic outcomes hamper their ability to 
achieve them despite serious consolidation 
efforts.21 
The original SGP provided for the correction 
of an excessive deficit to be completed “in the 
year following its identification unless there 
are special circumstances”, but did not 
specify what these “special circumstances” 
might be. Following the reform, the initial 
deadline for correcting an excessive deficit 
should remain, as a rule, the “year after 
identification”. However, the setting of this 
deadline and consideration as to whether 
there are special circumstances justifying an 
extension by one year should be based on a 
balanced overall assessment of exceptional 
circumstances, together with other mitigating 
and aggravating factors. We return to these 
factors (dealt with by Article 2.3 of 
Regulation 1467) later.  
Exceptional economic circumstances can also 
justify the reduction or abrogation of 
sanctions imposed on member states in the 
event of particularly serious non-compliance 
with budgetary policy obligations in the 
EDP.22  
In 2013 a number of countries, including 
France, had their EDP deadlines extended 
and the intensity of the effort required 
softened under these provisions.  
The Six Pack of 2011 made allowance for 
consideration of exceptional circumstances, 
also in the preventive arm of the SGP: under 
the Council Regulation 1466/97 as amended 
by Regulations 1055/2005 and 1175/2011 
(henceforth in this paper Regulation 1466)23 
they can be taken into consideration by the 
Commission and the Council to allow a 
temporary deviation from the adjustment 
path towards the MTO, on condition that this 
does not endanger fiscal sustainability in the 
medium term.24 Resort to this provision was 
                                                   
21 Article 3.5 of Regulation 1467.  
22 Article 6.4 of Regulation 1173/2011. 
23 (http://eurlex.europa.eu/LexUriServ/LexUriServ.
do?uri=CONSLEG:1997R1466:20111213:EN:PDF). 
24 Articles 5.1 par. 10 and 6.3 par. 4 of Regulation 
1466. 
granted to Italy by the Council in 2013, 
making it possible for that country to 
postpone achievement of structural balance 
following a sharp downturn of economic 
activity, but has been denied in 2014.25  
3. Structural reforms and the other 
relevant factors  
The preventive arm of SGP allows for 
important elements of flexibility in defining 
the adjustment path towards the MTO or 
consenting member states to deviate 
temporarily from it, most notably the 
effective implementation of structural 
reforms capable of underpinning financial 
stability by strengthening the economy and 
raising potential growth.26 The Specifications 
on the implementation of the SGP (the so-
called Code of Conduct) stress that only 
“adopted reforms” will be considered for this 
purpose. 27  Moreover, here too a safety 
margin with respect to the 3% deficit 
reference value must be guaranteed at all 
times, 28  and the budgetary position must 
return to the MTO within the three-year 
period covered by the Stability Programme.  
The rationale is that structural reforms may 
bring about long-term expenditure cuts and 
revenue increases, e.g. stemming from 
improved sustainability of the health and 
pension system or reduced long-term 
unemployment following labour market 
reform, even if they may entail short-term 
costs for public finances. And indeed the 
Code of Conduct explicitly mentions 
structural reform in these areas as factors 
permitting temporary deviations from the 
MTO. Special consideration will be given to 
“pension reforms introducing multi-pillar 
systems that include a mandatory, fully 
                                                   
25  Cf. The Council 2014 Country Specific 
Recommendations on Italy (10791/14).  
26 Article 5.1 Regulation 1466. 
27 Economic and Financial Committee (2012), p. 7. 
28 This safety margin will be evaluated by the 
Commission taking into account past output 
volatility and the budgetary sensitivity of output 
fluctuations. Cf. the Code of Conduct, Economic and 
Financial Committee (2012). 
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funded pillar”. In this case the permitted 
deviation from the MTO should reflect the 
net cost of the reform for the general 
government budget,29 and always providing 
that the safety margin for deficit ratio is 
preserved.30 
Due consideration to pension reform will also 
be given by the Council and the Commission 
when assessing compliance with the deficit 
and debt criterion and in the subsequent 
steps of the EDP procedure. In particular, a 
broader assessment on the overall features of 
the pension system created by the reform will 
verify whether it promotes long-term 
sustainability while not increasing risks for 
the medium-term budgetary position.31 
According to Article 126.3 of the Treaty, the 
European Commission is always required to 
prepare a report to the Council when it finds 
that the government deficit and/or debt 
ratios exceed the reference values and are not 
diminishing at a satisfactory pace. In this 
report, which constitutes the first step of an 
EDP, the Commission must take into account 
whether the deficit exceeds investment 
expenditure and “all other relevant factors, 
including the medium-term economic and 
budgetary position of the member state”.  
In this regard, Article 2.3 of Regulation 1467 
specifies that the Commission report must 
cover all relevant medium-term 
developments regarding: 
a. the economic position, including potential 
growth, the different contributions 
                                                   
29 In evaluating the cost of the reform, only annual 
incremental increases in that cost will be considered. 
30 The costs of pension reforms covered by the clause 
are those linked to diverting part of social security 
contributions to the pension scheme established by 
the reform, which entails a permanent reduction of 
revenues and in the short term worsens the 
government balance. However, over the long run, 
such costs are compensated by the reduction in 
pension expenditure to be paid by the public 
scheme. The first application of the provision on 
pension reform arose in 2013 with Latvia. 
31 Article 2.5 of Regulation 1467. Under EDP the full 
costs of the reform are considered every year and not 
only their incremental increase as under the 
preventive arm. 
provided by labour, capital accumulation 
and total factor productivity, cyclical 
developments and the private sector net 
saving position;  
b. the budgetary position, and notably the 
record of adjustment towards the MTO, 
the level of the primary balance and 
developments in primary expenditure, 
both current and capital, and the overall 
quality of public finances;  
c. the debt position, its dynamics and 
sustainability, including any implicit 
liabilities related to ageing and private 
debt, to the extent that it may represent a 
contingent implicit liability for the 
government. 
Furthermore, due consideration will be given 
to any other factors which, in the opinion of 
the member state concerned, are relevant in 
order to comprehensively assess compliance 
with the deficit and debt criteria. 32  For 
instance, in 2011 the Italian government 
argued that the sum of the net public and 
private debt positions should also be taken 
into consideration when assessing a 
member’s financial conditions and their 
sustainability. An objection raised against 
this concept was that there is no guarantee 
that domestic investors will behave 
differently from foreign investors when 
confidence in the sovereign’s solvency 
evaporates.    
Under certain conditions, consideration of 
“relevant factors” may lead to not placing a 
member state in EDP, e.g. when the deficit 
ratio has been exceeded but the debt ratio is 
below the reference value. Similarly, a breach 
of the debt reduction benchmark may result 
in the opening of an EDP only after relevant 
factors have been taken into account; 
similarly, these factors will be considered in 
                                                   
32 To this end, special consideration will be given to: 
“budgetary efforts towards increasing or 
maintaining at a high level financial contributions to 
fostering international solidarity and to achieving 
Union policy goals; the debt incurred in the form of 
bilateral and multilateral support between member 
states in the context of safeguarding financial 
stability; the debt related to financial stabilisation 
operations during major financial disturbances”. 
FLEXIBILITY CLAUSES IN THE STABILITY AND GROWTH PACT: NO NEED FOR REVISION | 9 
 
the recommendations for correcting the 
excessive deficit, including the deficit 
reduction path. 
4. The investment clause  
During the crisis, activity fell more rapidly 
than expected in countries undertaking tough 
adjustment programmes to restore 
sustainable budgetary and competitive 
positions, also dragging down the ‘core’ 
economies and pushing the entire eurozone 
into recession. Unfortunately, the easiest 
target of fiscal consolidation was public 
investment, which fell dramatically in the 
crisis years.33  
In its Blueprint for a deep and a genuine 
EMU, 34  the European Commission 
summarised the few specific provisions for 
public investment already provided for in the 
SGP. Public investment is one of the factors to 
be taken into account in the EDP when 
assessing the fiscal position of a member state 
(Article 126.3 TFEU).35 In the preventive arm 
of the SGP, in assessing the public 
expenditure growth path, public investment 
is averaged over a number of years, so as to 
avoid penalising member states experiencing 
temporary peaks in investment. Expenditure 
on Union programmes, including investment 
expenditure, is also excluded in assessing 
compliance with the expenditure benchmark, 
for the part covered by EU funds. Of course, 
none of these provisions prevented a sharp 
drop in public investment, as has been 
recalled, but this was member states’ choice 
rather than a result of SGP rules.  
In June 2012 and again in March 2013, the 
European Council recognised in their 
conclusions the need to “balance the 
productive public investment needs with 
fiscal discipline objectives”; 36  thus opening 
                                                   
33 Cf. Barbiero & Darvass (2014). 
34 European Commission (2012). 
35 Specifically, Article 126(3) states that: "The report 
of the Commission shall also take into account 
whether the government deficit exceeds government 
investment expenditure (…)". 
36  Council Conclusions, 13-14 June 2012 p. 1 and 
14/15 March 2013 p.2. 
the door to a specific investment allowance in 
the SGP preventive arm that would relax 
MTO deficit convergence obligation while 
still respecting the 3% constraint. This 
intention was transformed into a legal 
provision in the Two Pack37 that requires the 
Commission to report to the Council on this 
issue by 31 July 2013. Accordingly, on 3 July 
2013 Commissioner Olli Rehn sent a letter to 
the member states to clarify the statement in 
the Blueprint, stating that the Commission 
would allow temporary deviations from the 
structural deficit path towards the MTO, or 
from the MTO for member states that have 
reached it, provided that three conditions 
were met: 
1) economic growth is negative or well 
below its potential;  
2) the deviation does not lead to a breach of 
the 3% deficit ceiling and the public debt 
rule is respected; 
3) the deviation from the MTO is linked to 
national expenditures on projects co-
funded by the EU under its Structural and 
Cohesion policy, Trans-European 
Networks and Connecting Europe 
Facility.  
The Commission has also clarified that this 
investment clause should not be confused 
with the proposals to exclude growth-
enhancing investment from the deficit ceiling 
(the so-called golden rule of public finance), 
which does not worsen the debt time-path 
only when the total (economic and financial) 
return to those investments fully covers their 
cost. The problem here is that the notion of 
public investment and the calculation of 
returns is ill-defined and exposed to 
manipulation by opportunistic politicians 
(Balassone & Franco, 2001), possibly opening 
the gates to the excessive growth in 
government debt that the SGP was meant to 
avoid. 
The investment clause was to apply only as 
long as the current depressed economic 
conditions continue. Once the economy 
recovers any deviation from the MTO must 
                                                   
37 Article 16.2 of Regulation 473/2013. 
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be compensated for, thus ensuring that the 
time-path towards the MTO is not affected. In 
his letter mentioned above, Commissioner 
Rehn announced that the rule would be 
applicable when assessing 2014 national 
budgets and the budgetary outcomes for 
2013. The Commission, however, has 
remained staunchly opposed to using this 
clause and managed to reject Italy’s request 
to use it in autumn 2013 on the grounds that 
the country was not compliant with the debt-
ratio reduction path.  
5. Conclusions 
Our review of the SGP indicates that there is 
no need to revise the existing rules to 
introduce greater flexibility during the 
current depressed economic conditions.38  
First, the SGP has ample room to 
accommodate the need for countering cyclical 
oscillations in the economy through the 
operation of budgetary stabilisers. This is 
obviously true for countries respecting the 
budgetary MTO of “close to balance or in 
surplus” – the MTO is calculated on a 
“structural” basis so they would be able to 
fully exploit the 3% margin for the deficit 
ratio. But it also applies to countries still 
working to achieve their MTO, provided they 
do not exceed the 3% threshold, as well as to 
countries in EDP, under the “exceptional 
circumstances” clause. It should be stressed 
here that the 3% limit is not an unassailable 
wall, since countries may well decide to 
break it and enter the EDP when they feel 
that this is absolutely necessary in view of 
economic circumstances. Indeed, the EDP is 
also sufficiently flexible to accommodate such 
special needs. Of course, scrutiny by the 
Commission is tightened whenever the MTO 
                                                   
38 Cf. Tosato (2014), who stresses that: i) the rigidity 
of the rules is mitigated by adequate flexibility in 
their application; ii) their application always 
involves the continuing participation of national 
budgetary authorities, with the twofold purpose of 
ensuring their ‘ownerhip’ of policy 
recommendations and, at the same time, making it 
possible for national authorities to shape concrete 
measures with full appreciation of national 
specificities. 
is not respected, and even more when a 
country crosses the 3% threshold, but this is a 
natural consequence of the need to avoid 
undesirable spillovers on financial stability of 
the eurozone as a whole.  
As for the investment clause, it appears that 
its potential role in creating room for growth-
enhancing public spending has been 
overemphasised, for the twofold reason that 
all spending in the end adds to the debt 
dynamics and that investment spending 
when the public budget is out of order rarely 
is for real investment. It has been argued that 
this latter problem would be less serious if 
the investment projects were those approved 
by the Commission for the utilisation of 
structural funds, thus ensuring their proper 
quality. However, in this case there would be 
a better way to raise the room for public 
investment that would not impinge on the 
deficit ratio, i.e. to lower the matching fund 
requirement for the utilisation of structural 
funds, say from 50 to 25%.   
The same conclusion applies, a fortiori, for 
deviations from the MTO to accommodate 
the short-term costs of structural reforms, 
both as regards the deficit and the debt ratios. 
Indeed, in its preventive arm the SGP pays 
great attention to the need to accompany 
member states undertaking ambitious reform 
with larger budgetary margins during the 
transition to the new regime; the tight 
constraint to be respected is that these 
reforms must be ‘adopted’ and not simply 
announced. Of particular importance is the 
allowance made by the SGP for assessing 
flexibly the adjustment path of the debt ratio 
to GDP – in view of “its dynamics and 
sustainability” – in the presence of structural 
reform that credibly improves the debt time-
path in the medium- to-long term.   
In sum, SGP rules already contain the 
flexibility required to accommodate cyclical 
downswings in the economy and structural 
reforms, while there can be no lasting 
benefits from relaxing its constraints. These 
could slow budgetary consolidation and once 
more raise the prospect of financial instability 
in the entire eurozone.     
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Table 1. THE EVOLUTION OF THE STABILITY AND GROWTH PACT: PREVENTIVE ARM 
 1997 SGP 2005 SGP 2011-2013 SGP 
Objective MTO close to balance or 
in surplus 
 Country specific MTO in structural terms 
 Safety margin against the 3% deficit/GDP limit 
 Room for budgetary manoeuvre  MTO> -1% of 
GDP 
 Expenditure benchmark: expenditure growth net of 
discretionary revenue measures not exceed a 
reference medium-term rate of potential GDP growth 
 MTO >-0.5% of GDP unless debt significantly below 
60% of GDP and low risk for sustainability (TSCG) 
Ex-ante assessment of 
progress towards the 
MTO 
   Ex-ante monitoring of MS budgetary policies (EZ 
only): common budgetary timeline to monitor and 
share information on MS budgetary policies before 
their adoption 
  Possibility for Commission to require a revised draft 
budgetary in case of serious non-compliance with the 
SGP (Two-Pack I) 
Adjustment path - Annual adjustment: benchmark of +0.5% of GDP 
(structural terms) more in good times, less in bad 
times 
 >0.5% of GDP when debt >60% of GDP or risk of 
overall debt sustainability 
 Automatic correction mechanism in national legal 






Possible for ‘major’ structural reforms with verifiable 
impact on long-term (emphasis on pensions reform) 
 In case of unusual events outside the control of the 
MS with a major impact on the financial position of 
the general government 
 In case of severe economic downturn 
Enforcement - - 
 
 Procedure for correcting significant deviation (0.5% 
of GDP in one year or cumulatively over 2 years from 
MTO or the adjustment path towards it) 
 Sanction in case of repeated non compliance (interest-
bearing deposit of 0.2% of GDP), EZ only, reversed 
QMV 
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Table 2. THE EVOLUTION OF THE STABILITY AND GROWTH PACT: CORRECTIVE ARM 
 1997 SGP 2005 SGP 2011-2013 SGP 
Objective To correct excess over the 
references values: 
Deficit : 3%of GDP 
Debt: 60% of GDP, or sufficiently 
diminishing 
 New operational criterion for the evaluation of the public 
debt reduction towards the 60% of GDP threshold (‘1/20 
rule’) 
Assessment     The EDP will take account of ‘all’ relevant factors 
(mitigating/aggravating), such as private sector debt, 
(pension) implicit liabilities, ageing 
 For countries under an EDP, increasing scope and 
frequency of information to be submitted to the 
Commission and to the Council for their review (Two 
Pack I): 
 Graduated monitoring including regular reporting by 
the MS every 6 or 3 months, according to the stage of 
the procedure, to early detect a risk for not correcting 
MS’s excessive deficit by the set deadline. The 
Commission may issue a recommendation to the MS 
to take further or different action 
 EZ MS entering EDP required to draft economic 
partnership programmes for structural reforms for the 
effective and lasting correction of the excessive deficit 







 If effective corrective action has been taken and 
 In case of unusual events outside the control of 
the MS with a major impact on the financial 
position of the general government 
 In case of severe economic downturn 
Enforcement Sanctions at the end of the 
procedure in case of no-
compliance with Council decisions 
 Early and gradual sanction system to be activated at each 
stage of the EDP (reversed QMV, except for latest stage of 
sanctions) 
Source: all relevant legal text for SGP and Fraine et al (2013). Note: MS: member states EZ: Eurozone member states, QMV qualified majority voting. 
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